

Threatening what the terrorists and their supporters hold dear can be an effective method if we understand the values held by the different levels of a terrorist group and support network.

173

General Description of the Literature:

Several scholars in the political science and policy literatures, including Davis and Jenkins (2002), Lantis (2008), and Kroenig (n.d.), argue that deterrence strategies need to be tailored to the different actors in a terrorist network. Indeed, the 2008 National Defense Strategy explicitly outlines a U.S. policy of tailored deterrence. Scholars (e.g., Kroenig n.d., Byman 2005, 108) provide illustrative evidence of how different actors in a terrorist network, such as state sponsors and radical Muslim clerics, have different goals and therefore can best be influenced through tailored policies. There is, however, no more systematic evidence from VEOs to support this hypothesized dynamic. Payne (2001), however, conducts case studies demonstrating the importance of tailoring deterrence in the state-to-state context.

Detailed Analyses

173: *Threatening what the terrorists and their supporters hold dear can be an effective method if we understand the values held by the different levels of a terrorist group and support network.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Kroenig (n.d.) provides a number of illustrative examples of how tailored policies can deter certain actors in a terror network. He shows, for example, that UK laws against the glorification of terrorism adopted in 2006 have deterred some radical clerics from preaching incendiary sermons. Byman (2005) gives a number of examples of deterrence against state sponsors of terrorism, including an Iranian decision to reduce its support during the 1990s for fear of provoking increased U.S. pressure. In a study of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, Payne (2001) demonstrates, through an investigation of declassified Soviet documents, that U.S. and Soviet officials had different understandings of nuclear war, and that U.S. deterrence policy would have been placed on a sounder footing had U.S. officials better understood Soviet strategic culture. Though relying on extensive historical research, the lack of a comparison to a case in which a country better understood its adversary, tailored its policies accordingly, and, therefore, was more effective at deterrence, means that the empirical support for the tailored deterrence hypothesis provided by Payne cannot be said to be anything more than anecdotal.

Empirical Support Score: 1

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: The Kroenig and Byman studies were conducted in the VEO context and thus can be expected to be directly applicable to VEOs, although it should be emphasized again that the authors pointed to anecdotal evidence only. The Payne research did not focus on VEOs, limiting its generalizability to VEOs.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.



Bibliography:

Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Davis, Paul, and Brian Jenkins. 2002. *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Kroenig, Matthew. "How to Deter Terrorism."
http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_How%20to%20Deter%20Terrorism.pdf.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. 2008. "Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice." *Contemporary Security Policy* 30: 467-485.

Payne, Keith. 2001. *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

Talmadge, Caitlin. 2007. "Deterring a Nuclear 9/11." *The Washington Quarterly* 30(2): 21-34.

Wilson, W. 2008. "The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence." *The Nonproliferation Review* 15(3): 421-439.