As US military aid to and intervention in foreign countries increase, terrorist attacks by VEOs from those countries on US citizens increase.

General Description of the Literature:

DeRouen and Heo (2004) argue that if the US really is a hegemon then there should be visible means of exerting influence. They cite Steven Lukes’ (1974) work on the third face of power as he articulates a form of power that is directly relevant to the analysis of aid and influence. Lukes argues that when power is wielded there need not be an explicit or observable tension. Hegemonic power might be chronic rather than acute. Lukes (1974, 31) refers to this as “power over” rather than “power to”. In short, a hegemon can attain “compliance by overcoming or averting … opposition” (Lukes, 1974, p. 31). Thus there is potential for aid to wield power over time and in the forms of inducement or reward. Aid as influence could come in economic or military forms. DeRouen and Heo cite a rather large literature on dependence and compliance. Most of this literature is in the US context. These studies look for empirical patterns between various forms of dependence (aid, trade, economic) and foreign policy compliance. Compliance is often measured using UN votes. The literature suggests that the US might reward or punish past behavior or induce states into changing future behavior. These actions are both relevant in terms of fighting VEOs. Ostensibly, the US will reward those states who cooperate in COIN efforts and punish those that do not. Important states such as Pakistan and Indonesia might be induced into increasing future cooperation on counterterrorism. Neumeyer and Plumper (2011), on the other hand, contend that US military aid leads to more terror against US citizens abroad. They write (p. 14) that because VEOs want to affect their country's policies in a dramatic fashion “American military support to foreign governments creates an incentive for foreign terrorist groups to attack Americans.” Note that this runs counter to the logic of Pape who argues that the target of suicide terror is the public in a democratic occupier (e.g., Israel, Sri Lanka, USA, France).

Detailed Analyses

165: As US military aid to and intervention in foreign countries increase, terrorist attacks by VEOs from those countries on US citizens increase.

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: DeRouen and Heo used VAR models which do not assume a direction of causality between aid and influence. Thus their model could capture reward, punishment, or inducement. They report that, in general, from 1946-1996 US military aid to Latin America was given in reward based on past behavior. Aid to Africa was also as reward but in the form of economic support. There was no pattern for Asia or the Middle East. Neumayer and Plumper (2011) present evidence that US aid, arms exports, and troops increase the probability of attacks on Americans in that country. An obvious difference between DeRouen and Heo and Neumayer and Plumper is that the former controls for the influence the US has on the country. Military aid (or US troops) to a friendly country is quite different than aid to an unfriendly country. Also, how important are the outliers of Iraq and Afghanistan to the Neumayer results? It is also important to keep in mind that the DeRouen and Heo study does not focus on VEOs and is only indirectly relevant. Asal and Rethemeyer (2009) find that the presence of U.S. troops in a non-democratic country with a VEO increases the probability the VEO will target U.S. interests. Specifically they found that the presence of more than 2,000 troops in this type of setting signaled a higher probability of attacks on U.S. interests.
Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Aid can potentially lead to influence over another country. Military aid and exports are shown to lead to more attacks on Americans in the recipient country. Context is important; is the US in the country with the approval of the government? Is there a government? We must also consider that the attacks on the Americans could be causing more aid and troops.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

166: US troops in a country that is not a democracy will increase VEO activity against the USA.

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Asal and Rethemeyer (2009) find that the presence of U.S. troops in a non-democratic country with a VEO increases the probability the VEO will target U.S. interests. Specifically they found that the presence of more than 2,000 troops in this type of setting signaled a higher probability of attacks on U.S. interests. Neumayer and Plumper (2011) also report that more US troops leads to more attacks aimed at Americans in that country. There is a potential endogeneity or selection problem because there probably are more American civilians working in countries with high numbers of troops.

Empirical Support Score: 7 = Single, high-quality quantitative analysis supporting the hypothesis.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Based on the Neumayer study, the policy advice is that reducing troops could reduce risk to Americans.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

Bibliography:


