

VEOs with diversified supplier relationships are harder to coerce, deter, and co-opt.

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General Description of the Literature:

It is possible that VEOs with diversified supplier relationships are harder to coerce, deter, and co-opt as organizations with multiple resource suppliers can always substitute away from one supplier to another in order to circumnavigate attempts at influence. There have been no empirical studies on this phenomenon as it relates to VEOs, but a study by Pape (1997) on sanctions against states provides some empirical support for this idea in a different context.

Detailed Analyses

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Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Pape (1997) conducted a study on the use of sanctions against states historically and finds that sanctions rarely work. In fact, he finds that economic sanctions were only effective in achieving political goals in 5 of 115 cases from 1914 to 1990. He conjectures that this phenomenon might be due in part to economic globalization that provides states with multiple outlets for trade and investment allowing them to bypass porous sanctions regimes.

Empirical Support Score: 7

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Pape's study was conducted on states in situations of economic globalization, so they are not directly applicable to VEOs. Nevertheless, given the strength of the logic and the support in the state-to-state context, there is reason to believe that this dynamic might also apply to VEOs.

Applicability Score: Moderate Confidence – Empirical results are derived from alternative contexts, but the researcher has *some* degree of confidence that they apply similarly to the context of influencing VEOs

Bibliography:

Pape, Robert. 1997. "Why Sanctions Don't Work." *International Security* 22: 90-136