

Deterrence will be enhanced if the government shows determination, that is, it is prepared to counter the VEOs in the long run; maintaining pressure is key.

15; 31

General Description of the Literature:

Questions of strength and resolve in relation to reducing terror attacks refer to deterrence. Davis and Jenkins (2002, 26) note US deterrence of VEOs was lacking prior to 9/11. The US did not effectively deter Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1983, and did not respond forcefully after the USS Cole attack in 2000. Without a strong response, the credibility of US deterrence was called into question. Davis and Jenkins (2002, 26-27) make the vivid point that al Qaeda probably actually believed based on less than overwhelming US responses leading up to 9/11 it could drive the US out of the region just as the Soviets had been driven out of Afghanistan. VEO deterrence is so different from standard state-to-state general deterrence, that it is unclear in some circles that forceful responses (or threats thereof) are effective. These examples point to difficult questions one encounters when considering the VEO deterrence. Knopf (2010) observes that most research accepts that deterrence will continue to play a role after 9/11 but this role is likely to be less central than it was during the Cold War. Deterrence is being broadened to include various forms of influencing VEOs. For example, deterrence is being reshaped to include the use of information and discourse as a means of influencing VEOs (Knopf 2010). Knopf's so-called fourth wave of deterrence differs from conventional or general deterrence among states maintaining their security in an anarchic system. Fourth wave deterrence is focused on asymmetric relationships between states and non-state VEOs (though some VEOs are harbored by states). Knopf (p. 10) notes three mechanisms of fourth wave deterrence: 1) pressure third parties that support VEOs; 2) deterrence by denial, i.e. deter a potential VEO action by convincing the group it will not work, nor will it lead to a positive outcome; and 3) delegitimization, i.e. to work on the VEOs justification for terror. Strength and resolve are most relevant to the first two types.

Researchers in the fields of politics, government, and international affairs argue that long-term attrition wears down VEOs (e.g., Gvineria 2009; Knopf 2010; Lake 2002; Sanchez-Cuenca 2004). Knopf (2010) analyzed the existing literature on counterterror strategies aimed at deterrence and noted that researchers had found that as the deterrent effects of a counterterrorist attack are short-lived, long-term attrition is necessary to deter extremist groups. Lake (2002) notes that one way terrorism might be modeled is as a "war of attrition" in which one side (presumably the state) increases the costs associated with terrorist activity to such an extent that the other (the VEO) can no longer absorb the costs. There is anecdotal evidence and limited empirical evidence detailing the success of long term attrition. Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) utilizes a war of attrition model as the framework for his comparative analysis on the ETA and IRA extremist organizations.

Detailed Analyses

15: *Deterrence will be enhanced if the government shows determination, that is, it is prepared to counter the VEOs in the long run; maintaining pressure is key.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Goron Almog (2004/2005, cited in Knopf 2010) notes that over the decades Israeli deterrence has been enhanced by a cumulative effect. Over time, the

neighboring confrontation states have become less threatening as they have repeatedly lost wars to Israel. Almog argues the same approach can be taken against VEOs by denying some attacks (deterrence by denial; e.g., the West Bank wall, check points), retaliating against others, and adopting a posture of patience. The British experience with the IRA is a similar case. The notion of cumulative deterrence has potential.

Davis and Jenkins (2002) provide additional support for this hypothesis. They argue that pre-9/11 VEO deterrence was not credible. On the whole, there is scholarly and policy-maker support for the position that deterrence is still relevant but that it has expanded beyond simple punishment and denial to include delegitimization (Knopf 2010). Because of this broader definition, Davis and Jenkins (2002) use the term influence rather than deterrence. Davis and Jenkins (2002) note that the first type of fourth wave deterrence (indirect pressure on third parties; see Knopf 2010) can work if VEOs are thought of as networks. Different nodes of the network can be threatened with punishment, though it is unlikely that deterrence with the threat of punishment could work on a large network such as al Qaeda. Additionally, according to Davis and Jenkins (2002), deterrence by denial is likely to be more effective in curbing terrorism as VEOs avoid operational risk. They conclude that the focus should be on influencing VEOs rather than deterring them (hence the title of this SMA). Knopf (2010, 25) observes there is little to no empirical support for the effectiveness of fourth wave deterrence. He also notes (pgs. 26-27) that it is essential that policy makers outline not only 'who' to deter but also 'what' to deter. In a follow-up to Davis and Jenkins (2002), Davis (2010) further expounds on influencing VEOs with an emphasis on al Qaeda. Almog (2004/2005) presents limited empirical evidence that cumulative deterrence has worked on Palestinian terrorists. Bar (2009) also writes that Israel has successfully deterred Palestinian groups.

Empirical Support Score: 4 = Single systematic case study supporting the hypothesis.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: The concept of cumulative deterrence is applicable to VEO influence. Cumulative deterrence can have punishment and denial components. It can also include delegitimization.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

31: Long-term attrition (constant and successful) can wear down VEOs and lead to their failure.

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: In a general overview on the decline of terrorist activities and organizations, Gvineria (2009) cites the examples of the Red Brigades and Shining Path being worn down through attrition. In a comparative case study of national liberation violence, Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) examines how extremist organizations such as the IRA and ETA fought in a war of attrition in their quest for national liberation. If the VEO cannot absorb the costs, it will be worn down over time. In an assessment of extremist trends in South Asia, Nicoll and Delaney (2010) noted that an example of this war of attrition was being waged by the United States against al-Qaeda in the FATA, in which constant drone strikes led to the attrition of numerous leaders.

Empirical Support Score: 6 = Comparative case studies supporting the hypothesis.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: All of the empirical and anecdotal research included above pertains directly to influencing violent extremist organizations through discussions of the effects of long-term attrition on these organizations' survivability.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

General Comments:

It is important to keep in mind that providing empirical support for deterrence is not easy. It would involve demonstrating why something that you do not want to happen (terrorism) did not happen (deterrence). This point is brought out in the Huth and Russett (1990) article on extended immediate deterrence.

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