

Law enforcement and intelligence are more effective than military operations in lowering VEO activity.

13; 78; 79

General Description of the Literature:

While the study of law enforcement and intelligence operations on influencing VEOs has drawn from both criminological and political science literatures, a predominant focus has been on the effect of arrests (by either local or national police forces) on VEO attacks. The results have been mixed, with several studies supporting a greater effect for law enforcement actions than military operations (Hussain 2009; Perkoski and Chenoweth 2010), while others found that law enforcement actions subsequently increased terrorist activity and military operations either decreased terrorist activity (LaFree, Dugan and Korte 2009) or increased terrorist activity (Fielding and Shortland 2010). Studies of the effects of arrests on other attributes of terrorist organizations (membership, financing, communal support) are non-existent, in addition to quantitative studies of intelligence operations on terrorist activity. Several descriptive case studies have examined the role of intelligence in various national contexts, finding beneficial effects of concentrated intelligence gathering in Japan (Jones and Libicki 2008) and Italy (Mosconi and Pisapia 1981; Seton-Watson 1988). However, the effects were temporary in other contexts due to legal limitations and court rulings overturning convictions resulting from intelligence operations (Greer 1995). Promising efforts to understand the extent to which minority community members are willing to cooperate with the police in countering terrorism (Tyler, Schulhoffer, and Huq 2010) highlight the gap in the literature regarding the context of intelligence gathering and law enforcement efforts beyond the police agency-level perspective.

Detailed Analyses

13: *Law enforcement and intelligence are more effective than military operations in lowering VEO activity.*

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Studies comparing military and police interventions tend to find mixed results regarding which is more effective, if at all. LaFree et al. (2009) identified only one intervention (military occupation during Operation Motorman) that had a deterrent effect on IRA attacks, while other interventions had either a non-significant or positive effect on subsequent attacks (including two criminal justice interventions that increased terrorist activity). Hussain (2009) found that arrests of terrorist leaders and supporters in Pakistan contributed to an increase in concurrent terrorist activity, with a subsequent decrease in terrorist activity in the following 6 months. Fielding and Shortland (2010) find that both political arrests and security force raids increased subsequent insurgent activity in the immediate months that follow the intervention. Finally, Perkoski and Chenoweth (2010) identify the arrests of ETA members contributed to a decrease in the hazard of a subsequent ETA attack, although the effect was weak unless combined with additional security legislation or discriminate repression against ETA supporters by the Spanish government. Descriptive case studies of intelligence gathering by law enforcement suggests that they are mostly effective in dismantling terrorist organizations (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Mosconi and Pisapia, 1981; Seton-Watson, 1988), although the effects can be hampered by legal limitations (Greer, 1995) or bureaucratic inflexibility (Hitz, 2010).

Empirical Support Score: 2 = Multiple qualitative and/or quantitative studies with mixed results (i.e., some in favor, some against the hypothesis) but more negative than positive findings

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Most of the research has focused on the effects of arrests of terrorism suspects on subsequent terrorist actions, using data provided by official police sources or open media sources. LaFree et al (2009) used six macro-level interventions, Hussain (2009) used arrest data from Pakistani National Police, Fielding and Shortland (2010) used open source information on arrests and security force actions against armed political groups from Egyptian newspapers, while Perkoski and Chenoweth (2010) focused on a short time period (5 years) and a single group (ETA). Little to no research has been effectively carried out examining the effects of human intelligence or lower-level policing on subsequent terrorist activity, leaving a large gap in the literature. Indirect evidence provided by Tyler et al (2010) demonstrates that community cooperation in counterterrorism is an important consideration for policing and intelligence operations, and often overlooked within the literature. Additionally, in many countries, the intelligence and military operations are housed within the same organization, making the separation of these two efforts more difficult to disentangle.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs

78: Effective lower level policing (e.g. community level policing) can lower VEO activity.

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Directly, there is no evidence that community-level policing can lower VEO activity. Indirectly, however, scholars have considered the role that effective lower-level policing can have in eliciting cooperation among minority groups from which VEOs may draw their membership. Surveying a sample of 300 Muslim Americans in New York City, Tyler, Schulhoffer, and Huq (2010) found that the degree to which individuals perceived that the authorities were fair in treatment, and inclusive of minority viewpoints when making policies about how to combat terrorism, increased the respondent's willingness to notify the police of possible terrorist activity in their community. The effect of this perception in influencing the willingness to cooperate with the police was more important than the perception of terrorist threat severity or police effectiveness in the community.

Empirical Support Score: 1 = Anecdotal support only for the hypothesis

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: While there is no direct evidence, Tyler et al's (2010) study does provide an important bridge regarding the development of human intelligence and the reduction of VEO activity. Though only a single study, it does coincide with results from studies within criminology on citizens' cooperation with police and their perception of police's legitimacy (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006). The fairer and more just the police conduct themselves with respect to the public, the more likely the public is to cooperate with them to address crime problems in their communities

Applicability Score: Moderate Confidence – Empirical results are derived from alternative contexts, but the researcher has *some* degree of confidence that they apply similarly to the context of influencing VEOs.

79: Development of human intelligence can lower VEO threat

Summary of Relevant Empirical Evidence: Jones and Libicki (2008) found that the increases in intelligence gathering by Japan's police services after the Aum Shinrikyo attack were successful in removing the organization from terrorist activity in subsequent years. This intelligence effort would not have been possible without the arrest of key members, and their subsequent interrogations during detention. In addition, the rise of informants among the armed left and right within Italy during the 1970s and 1980s led to the arrests of hundreds of left-wing suspects, and the dismantling of whole armed organizations (Mosconi and Pisapia 1981; Seton-Watson 1988). The use of informants and

human intelligence is somewhat complicated by legal limitations on the use of intelligence gathered during these operations, evidenced by the vast number of convictions in Northern Ireland using the “supergrass” system of informants which were subsequently overturned after appeal hearings (Greer 1995). While these case studies provide more evidence to support rather than reject this hypothesis, there is anecdotal evidence in studies of bureaucratic organization in intelligence agencies suggesting that the actual gathering of intelligence in a timely and relevant manner is much more difficult to implement. Hitz (2010) noted that our development of human intelligence gathering, drawn from lessons during the Cold War, will not be as effective with the rise of Islamic terrorism, as we do not have a mature enough understanding of Islamic mores and culture to know the specific pressure points within jihadi groups. Hitz (2010) also suggests that the bureaucratic nature of most intelligence agencies prevents them from effectively adapting to moving terrorist threats and the challenges of developing human intelligence. Subsequently, it may become easier and easier to rely on signals intelligence and electronic means of information gathering in future counter-VEO operations, rather than the time-consuming and risky development of human intelligence.

Empirical Support Score: 3 = Multiple qualitative and/or quantitative studies with mixed results (i.e. some in favor, some against the hypothesis), but more positive than negative findings.

Applicability to Influencing VEOs: Most of the research has been group or country-specific, making it challenging to compare across contexts. Additionally, these case studies focus, to varying degrees, on the government’s side in developing intelligence, without consideration of the efforts to draw community support in providing intelligence to authorities (see Tyler et al. 2010). While the topic is definitely relevant to influencing IVEOs, testing these theories will be difficult in the future, as governmental efforts to develop human intelligence are not often shared with the public and available for analysis.

Applicability Score: Direct: At least some of the empirical results directly concern the context of influencing VEOs.

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